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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF D. U. COMPANY.

1(1).

DUC Objects to and Moves to Strike Certain of Elaine Jenkins' Facts.
Elaine Jenkins' Facts Nos. 1-14, 16-18, and 20-27 are from Defendants'

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and rely
on the Affidavit of Elaine Jenkins. DUC objected to and moved to strike those facts and
the Affidavit.

[R. 219-223 and R. 268] Those facts are not supported by admissible

evidence, were not properly before the trial court, and are not properly before this Court.
For the reasons stated in DUC's Motion to Strike [R. 219-223], it would be reversible
error for the trial court to rely on those facts in ruling on the parties' cross motions for
summary judgment. (It is unclear whether the trial court relied on those facts in denying
DUC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.) For the same reasons, it would be
reversible and prejudicial error for this Court, to consider those facts here. DUC again
objects to and moves to strike Elaine Jenkins' Facts Nos. 1-14, 16-18, and 20-27.

1(A).

Elaine and Sam Waived Any Claim to the Property.
On appeal, Elaine Jenkins does not dispute that Sam Jenkins waived any claim he

might have had to the Property. That alone is grounds for reversal.
While Elaine prefaces her Point 11(A) with a heading that "Sam and Elaine Jenkins"
did not waive their claim to the Property, her argument only refers to Elaine herself.
The other Defendants, Sam Jenkins' adult children, did not file or join in a Brief of
Appellee. Any claim they might have had would be as Sam's successors in interest. Sam
waived any such interest, whereupon any equitable interest Sam might have had in the
Property then vested in DUC as the legal owner of the Property.
- 1 -

DUC contends, not that Elaine waived a present interest of the Property because the
Property was not mentioned in the Divorce Decree, but that Elaine does not have a present
interest in the Property, because if she ever had an interest she waived it for the reasons
stated on pages 10-12 of the Brief of Appellant.
Elaine cites no authority for her contention that waiver can only be raised as an
affirmative defense. Defendants routinely waive rights. Rule 12(h) states that a defendant
waives all defenses but subject matter jurisdiction not presented by motion or pleading.
See Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383 f 4, 121 P.3d 717 ("If Plaintiffs failure to
comply with [a statute] did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, it is undisputed that
Defendant waived that issue ..."); Hamilton v. Regan, 938 P.2d 282, 283 fri 1 (Utah
1997) (by failing to oppose an motion, defendant waived any challenge to the motion);
Huckv. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986) (defendant waived any right to alimony);
Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986) (defendant waived issue of mitigation of
damages); Durbano Metals, Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., 574 P.2d 1159, 1162
(Utah 1978) (defendant waived contract provision).
Elaine waived any claim to the Property while she was a Plaintiff in her divorce
action. Her present status as a defendant is irrelevant.

1(B).

Elaine and Sam Contracted Away Any Claim to the Property.
On appeal. Defendants do not dispute that Sam's and Elaine's Stipulation was a

binding contract, and do not dispute what were the terms of the contract.
Elaine misstates DUC's argument. Sam and Elaine did not convey the Property to
DUC.

But Sam and Elaine did contractually agree that they had no interest in the

Property. Assuming they ever had an equitable estate in the Property, their agreement
abandoned any such estate, which had to go somewhere. It vested, not by contract, deed
or conveyance, but by operation of law, in DUC as the legal owner of the Property.
- 2 -

1(C).

Res Judicata Bars Defendants from Claiming the Property.

I(C)(i).

Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion.

Again, issue preclusion has four elements: (1) the party against whom issue
preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; (2) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one
presented in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must have been completely,
fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on
the merits. Defendants do not dispute that the first and fourth elements are satisfied.
Elaine seeks to avoid the "identity of issues" element by mixing two discrete issues
into one. The issue in the Jenkins divorce action was whether Sam and Elaine had an
equitable interest in the Property. Elaine claimed they had an interest in the Property,
while Sam claimed they did not. The final judgment held that they had no interest in the
Property. The issue DUC raised in this action is whether Sam and Elaine had an equitable
interest in the Property. That issue is identical to the issue in the Jenkins divorce action.
That issue does not depend on the separate issue of who held legal title to the Property.
Elaine's reliance on Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16
P.3d 1214 as a challenge to the "fairly litigated" element is misplaced. That Court stated
at t 43 (emphasis added; citations omitted):
An issue determined by stipulation rather than judicial resolution is
binding in a subsequent action if the parties manifested an intention to that
effect. In this case, Macris does not argue that the stipulation concerning
contract damages was not binding in general; rather, Macris argues that the
stipulation was not binding as to damages accruing after August 31, 1992, the
date on which Images transferred its assets to Neways. However, if the
stipulation is meant to be final as to some damages but not final as to other
damages, it must say so. Our review of the record in this case, however,
evidences no such intention. Moreover, the trial court made no finding that its
damages award - which was based on the parties stipulation - was not final as
to all damages. Therefore, we find that the stipulation in this case has res
judicata effect.

- 3 -

Before Sam and Elaine signed the Stipulation, they engaged in discovery and
litigation over Elaine's claim to an interest in the Property. Both the Stipulation and the
Decree of Divorce recite that other than a parcel in Idaho, Sam and Elaine "acquired no
other real property during the course of the marriage." Under Macris, if the Jenkins'
Stipulation was to be final as to some property interests but not final as to others, it had
to say so. Instead, the Stipulation stated that it "constitutes the entire agreement between
Plaintiff and Defendant, and resolves all issues presently outstanding between Plaintiff and
Defendant raised by the pleadings in this matter", which included issues of real property
ownership including the parties' potential interest in the Property in particular. The
Stipulation manifested an intention that the parties' determination of that issue would be
binding in a subsequent action. Any contrary subjective intent Elaine might have had is
irrelevant. And the trial court, far from finding that its determination of the issue was not
final, also held, "This Decree resolves all outstanding issues between Plaintiff and
Defendant raised directly or indirectly by the pleadings in this matter." Under the rule
stated in Macris, the Stipulation, Findings of Fact, and Decree of Divorce satisfy the
"fairly litigated" element of issue preclusion.
There is no "absurd result" in enforcing a Stipulation and Decree of Divorce which
resolved all property issues, and agreed and held that except for a parcel in Idaho, Sam and
Elaine acquired no other real property. And where as Sam contended all along, Sam and
Elaine did not have an interest in the Property, their Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce
would not give DUC a windfall. But even if it did, if Sam and Elaine disclaimed or
abandoned an equitable property interest, there is nothing absurd about such an interest
vesting in the record legal owner of the Property.
Elaine cites no authority for their contention that issue preclusion can only be raised
as an affirmative defense, because there is no such authority. Either side in a civil action
can invoke issue preclusion against the other side.
- 4 -

1(C)(ii).

Claim Preclusion.

Again, claim preclusion has three elements: (1) Both actions must involve the same
parties or their privies; (2) the claim to be barred must have been brought or available in
the first action, and (3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits
of the claim. On appeal, Elaine does not dispute that in the Jenkins divorce action she
asserted a claim to the Property, and that a final judgment was entered on the merits
holding that Sam and Elaine did not have an interest in the Property, which satisfies the
second two elements of claim preclusion. The first element of claim preclusion is satisfied
by privity, which includes a successive relationship to rights in property, Searle Bros, v.
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (UT 1978). The Decree of Divorce divested Sam and Elaine
of any equitable estate they might have had in the Property, which if they had any interest
in the first place then vested by operation of law in the legal owner, making DUC a
successor in privity of estate and satisfying the remaining element of claim preclusion.

1(D).

Defendants' Claim to the Property Is Barred by the
Statute of Frauds.
On appeal. Defendants do not dispute DUC's argument in Point 1(D) of the Brief of

Appellant that any claim Defendants had to the Property was barred by the statute of
frauds, Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1, and that the trial court erred by denying DUC summary
judgment based on the statute of frauds. This point alone requires a reversal.
1(E).

Defendants' Claim to the Property Is Barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Elaine argues only that (a) in the 2005 lawsuit the trial court entered a judgment more

than a year after litigation following dismissal of DUC as a party, and (b) after DUC
repudiated any duty it may have owed to Defendants, they continued to live in the
Property. Those arguments are irrelevant to whether Defendants' claims to the Property
-

5 -

are barred by a statute of limitations. Elaine has not even made a passing reference, much
less challenged, DUC's arguments in paragraphs 3-4 of DUC's Point 1(E).

1(F).

l

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Judgment for DUC on
Grounds of Res Judicata.
On appeal. Defendants do not dispute DUC's argument in Point 1(F) of the Brief of

Appellant that the trial court erred in denying Judgment for DUC on grounds of res
judicata as a result of the trial court in the 2005 lawsuit dismissing DUC as a party. This
point alone entitles DUC to a reversal of the trial court's judgment.
1(G).

The Trial Court Erred in Holding DUC's First Claim Was
Barred by Lack of Standing.
On appeal, Defendants do not dispute DUC's argument in Point 1(G) of the Brief of

Appellant that the trial court erred in holding DUC's First Claim for Relief was barred by
a lack of standing.

1(H).

POINT 11(F) OF THE BRIEF OF APPELLEE LACKS MERIT.

I(H)(i)

DUC's Claims Are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Because DUC had record legal title to the Property, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 is
not a limitation on DUC's First Claim for Relief to quiet title in the Property. The
timeliness of DUC's Complaint is governed by In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53 1f2728, 144 P.3d 1129 (emphasis added):

1

Defendants offer no evidence that "DUC relented." The evidence is to the contrary.
See DUC's Fact No. 11: "From May 15, 1997 to August 1, 1997 DUC sent Elaine a series of
letters with a rental agreement (lease) for Elaine to sign. When Elaine refused to sign, Alan
Jenkins stepped up and paid DUC for Elaine's rent himself..." That is not relenting, it is
merely accepting substitute performance by a third party.
- 6 -

When a party asserts a quiet title claim in which that party merely requests
that the court adjudicate the validity of an opponent's adverse or hostile
claim to property to which the party already holds title, no statute of
limitations applies. In other words, if it is not necessary that the court grant
other relief in favor of the party, such as cancelling a deed on the basis of
fraud, in order to rule on the quiet title claim, then the statute of limitations
cannot operate as a bar to the party's quiet title claim. Thus, in order to
determine whether the statute of limitations applies to a quiet title claim, the
court must assess on what basis the party would be entitled to have title
quieted. If the party is entitled to have title quieted only if the court first
finds in his or her favor on another legal issue, then the same statute of
limitations that applies to that legal issue will also apply to the quiet title
claim. Similarly, a party may seek to quiet title to real property in addition
to requesting other relief in the same action. Despite the fact that no statute
of limitations applies to a true quiet title claim, the respective statutes of
limitation applicable to the party's other claims for relief may operate to bar
those claims. If the party's claim for quiet title relief can be granted only if
the party succeeds on another claim, then the statute of limitations applicable
to the other claim will also apply to the quiet title claim. ... Accordingly,
we hold that true claims for quiet title relief, determined under the legal
framework set forth above, are not subject to a statute of limitations.
Because all DUC needs to prevail on its First Claim for Relief is for the trial court
to adjudicate DUC's existing record title to the Property, under In re Hoopiiaina Trust no
statute of limitations applies to DUC's quiet title action.
I(H)(ii)

DUC's Claims Are Not Barred by Laches.

Laches requires (a) a lack of diligence and (b) injury caused by the lack of diligence.
Elaine has not shown either. She relies on DUC's not having sued her after she refused
to sign a rental agreement. But DUC had no reason to sue. DUC already had legal title
to the Property, there was no writing evidencing any Defendant had any equitable interest
in the Property, and after Sam Jenkins' death his brother Alan Jenkins took over payment
of the rent. [Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 11] The facts show not a lack of diligence on
the part of DUC, but simply DUC accepting substitute performance by a third party of a
duty owed by Defendants.
Elaine offers no admissible evidence that Defendants treated the Property as their
own or made improvements. Those are conclusory allegations, not evidentiary facts.
"Once a movant sets forth a factual basis for summary judgment, the opponent must
- 7 -

respond with specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue for trial, and mere ...
conclusions in an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Guardian State
Bankv. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (UT 1988). "The mere assertion that an issue
of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is
insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion." Webster v. Sill, 675
P.2d 1170, 1172 (UT 1983). "Factual conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient to raise
a genuine issue of fact." Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah
1991).
There is no admissible evidence of a single improvement any Defendant ever made
to the Property, no evidence of a single dollar any of them paid toward upkeep of the
Property. Defendants were not injured by living in the home while someone else paid the
rent for them. That was a benefit to them, not a disadvantage.
Elaine's final argument turns the law on its head. DUC was not obliged to join
Jenkins' lawsuit or risk a laches defense in a lawsuit not yet filed.

Rather, it was

incumbent on Jenkins to bring any claims she had against DUC in the 2005 lawsuit or risk
having those claims barred by res judicata/claim preclusion for her failure to bring them.
I(H)(iii)

DUC's Claims Are Not Barred by Waiver.

DUC had legal title to the Property. Elaine relinquished any equitable claim to the
Property in her divorce action. Through Alan Jenkins, DUC had a paying tenant until
DUC sold the Property to him. The only fact Elaine relies on to support her waiver
argument is that, instead of filing a pleading in the 2005 lawsuit, DUC filed a successful
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Avoiding litigation with a successful motion to dismiss
is not an intentional relinquishment of any known right. It was not a waiver of DUC's
First Claim for Relief in this action.

- 8 -

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

11(1).

This Court Should Not Consider Certain of Elaine's Facts with
Respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

DUC has objected to and moved to strike Defendants' Facts Nos. 1-14, 16-18, and
20-27 as offered in support of the trial court's decision denying DUC's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. [Point 1(1) supra.]

Those facts are all based on Defendants'

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for (Partial) Summary Judgment and the
Affidavit of Elaine Jenkins. They were not presented to the trial court in support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, this Court should not consider
Elaine's Facts Nos. 1-14, 16-18, and 20-27 in ruling on the trial court's grant of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

11(A),

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing DUC's First Claim for Relief.

H(A)(i).

DUC's First Claim for Relief is Not Barred by Res Judicata.

Elaine's argument raises a question of first impression, namely, who is a "party" for
purposes of claim preclusion. Specifically, if a Complaint purportedly sues A and B, but
before A files any pleading the trial court dismisses A as a party on the grounds the
Complaint does not allege a claim against A, and the plaintiff and B then litigate the action
to a final judgment, is A a "party" with respect to the final judgment for purposes of the
first element of claim preclusion?

2

In the 2005 lawsuit Elaine filed a Second Amended Complaint which for the first time
in that lawsuit nominally named DUC but did not allege any claim against DUC. [R. 8791] DUC immediately served a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss [R. 92-97], which the trial

Defendants do not argue that DUC's first claim for relief is barred by issue preclusion.
- 9 -

court granted, entering an Order that dismissed DUC as a party to the action. [R. 98] The
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss was a final judgment on the merits, which Elaine did
not appeal. As a result of that Order, it has already been conclusively adjudicated that, at
least as of the date of the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, DUC was not a party to the
2005 lawsuit.
Defendants are themselves barred by claim preclusion from relitigating whether DUC
was a party. Defendants were parties or their privies in the 2005 lawsuit. They could
have made DUC a party by stating a claim against DUC. There was a final judgment on
the merits ordering that DUC was dismissed as a party, so that DUC was not a party.
"The party moving a court to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds bears the burden
of establishing [all] three elements." Miller v. US A A Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6 1 58, 44
P.3d 663. Elaine cites no authority for the idea that claim preclusion can be invoked
against DUC based on a judgment to which DUC was not a party, and was not a party at
any time during the discovery process, litigation, or trial. Defendants did not meet their
burden of proof on the "parties" element of claim preclusion. Under the facts of this case,
DUC was not a party to the 2005 lawsuit for purposes of claim preclusion.
For the reasons stated in Points 1(C) and 1(F) of the Brief of Appellant and Points
1(C) and 1(F) supra, it is Defendants and not DUC who are barred by both claim
preclusion and issue preclusion from asserting an interest in the Property. This raises
another question of first impression: If a claim (or issue) resolved by a final judgment in
one lawsuit (the Jenkins' Decree of Divorce) is res judicata as to the parties, and one of
those parties then obtains an inconsistent judgment in a second lawsuit (the 2005 lawsuit),
can that party use the later inconsistent judgment as a "final judgment" for purposes of res
judicata! DUC asks this Court to adopt a reasonable rule that the resolution of a claim or
issue in the first lawsuit to enter a final judgment on that claim or issue has res judicata
effect against parties to the first judgment over any subsequent inconsistent judgment.
- 10 -
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The "no legal basis" argument Elaine makes in Point I(B)(i)(b) of the Brief of
Appellee is an argument Defendants did not make to the trial court. [R. 106-108, 150]
This Court does not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. See Busch
Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987):
Generally, when an argument has not been made in the trial court, we will not
allow it to be raised on appeal. ... As we stated in Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Development Co.:
For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must clearly
show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot merely assume that
it was properly raised. The burden is on the parties to make certain
that the record they compile will adequately preserve their
arguments for review in the event of an appeal.
But even if this Court did reach that argument, voiding DUC's deed to Alan Jenkins
would re-vest in DUC whatever title DUC conveyed to Alan by operation of law, since
Defendants' claim to title rests on a judgment that is not res judicata as to DUC.
The "judicial estoppel" argument Elaine makes in Point I(B)(i)(c) of the Brief of
Appellee is also an argument Defendants did not make to the trial court. [R. 106-108,
150] Again, Defendants cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. But even if this Court
did reach that argument, DUC's motion to dismiss the 2005 lawsuit argued, based on
allegations in Elaine's Second Amended Complaint, that since she alleged Alan Jenkins
held legal title to the Property and she and her children had equitable title, there was no
interest in the Property left for DUC at the time (hence the pleading's failure to state a
claim against DUC). DUC's position was not a "sworn statement" but was an argument
made by counsel for DUC that relied on allegations in the 2005 lawsuit's Second Amended
Complaint. DUC's Second Claim for Relief in this action does not make any statement,
or assert any right to relief, that is inconsistent with the position DUC took in its motion
to dismiss. Therefore, judicial estoppel does not apply.

- 12 -

s

.V'^MKI

I lam,

.-a Kii'Kvi ; • i^ue

:

PILV:.)

V

reasons stated iji Point 11(A)! h \nnni. D I T was noi a n r i \ ir< ihe 200S lawsuit
a'i-

.::

. s - n

• * ,'

}]

'-

Second.

'

Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (IJI App.1987):
The final element of collateral estoppel requires that the i^-ue w;;!
competently, fully, and fairly litigated in lie Mr-, ^ n n :
i
element stems from fundamental due process and requires that
litigants have their day in court. For purposes of due process, the
parties must receive notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise them of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
The issue in Dl IC's Second Claim for Relief is whether, if DlJC's deed to Alan Jenkins
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The "treble damages" argument Elaine makes in Point I(B)(ii)(d) of the Brief of
Appellee is an argument Defendants did not make to the trial court. |R. 106-108, 150]
Again, Defendants cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. But even if this Court did
reach that argument, it is Defendants' burden to prove, based on undisputed facts, that
DUC could not recover punitive damages as a matter of law. Defendants have not even
attempted to meet that burden, but improperly seek to put the reverse burden on DUC.
11(B)(ii).

DUC Stated a Claim for Unpaid Rent.

The "res judicata" argument Elaine makes in Point I(B)(ii)(a) of the Brief of
Appellee is without merit for the reasons stated in Point 11(A)(1) supra.
Elaine's argument that DUC's Second Claim for Relief is barred by Utah R. Civ.
Proc. 13 also lacks merit. Rule 13(a) states, "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party
..." In the 2005 lawsuit "the time of serving the pleading" never came for DUC. Before
DUC would have had to serve any pleading, the court granted DUC's motion to dismiss.
Since Elaine's pleading in the 2005 lawsuit alleged no claims against DUC and DUC was
dismissed as a party and had no obligation to file any pleading, DUC did not have any
compulsory counterclaim and was never subject to Rule 13.
Based on the above, the trial court committed reversible error by dismissing DUC's
Second Claim for Relief on summary judgment.

11(C).
II(C)(i).

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing DUC's Third Claim for Relief.
DUC's Third Claim is Not Barred by Claim Preclusion.

For the reasons stated in Point II(A)(i) supra, the trial court committed reversible
error in relying on claim preclusion as a basis for dismissing DUC's Third Claim for
Relief on summary judgment.
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motion to strike. DUC simply asks this Court, should it remand this action for further
proceedings on the merits, to direct the trial court to rule on DUC's objections and motion
to strike, which if the trial court failed to do would give grounds for yet another appeal,
an outcome which DUC is confident neither this Court nor Defendants want.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO AWARD
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 11.
Elaine relies on subpart b(2) of Utah R. Civ. Proc. 11:
By presenting a pleading .. to the court, an attorney ... is certifying that to the
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances, (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law...
The trial court ruled:

"Upon consideration of plaintiff's underlying summary

judgment motion, I hereby decline defendants' invitation to award attorney fees against the
plaintiff. A reading thereof leaves me unconvinced that subsection (b) of Rule 11 has been
violated and consequently I find sanctions to be inappropriate."
Elaine incorrectly cited the standard of review for this ruling, which is:
Our review is three-tiered: "(1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of
error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."
Buckv. Robinson, 2008 UT App 28 1f 5, 177 P. 3d 648, quoting Morse v. Packer, 2000
UT86, 1 16, 15 P.3d 1021.
The trial court was not persuaded that the facts showed a Rule 11 violation.
Defendants have "the heavy burden of marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and then showing that those findings are not based on competent,
admissible evidence." Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry,
886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994). "The marshaled facts should 'correlate particular items
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A inotion for sanctions under this rule ... shall be served as provided in Rule
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day. The trial court had already issued a Minute Entry dismissing DUC's Complaint,
making it impossible for DUC to "withdraw or appropriately correct the challenged paper"
after receiving Defendants' Rule 11 motion. Because Defendants filed their motion with
the Court the same day they served it, and filed and served it only after the Court had
already dismissed the affected pleading, Defendants' violation of the Rule 11(c)(1)(A)
"safe harbor" notice provision would justify the trial court in denying Defendants' motion
for sanctions even if DUC had violated Rule 11(b)(2).
Defendants have not even argued that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to impose sanctions in the form of an award of attorney fees.
Based on the above, the Court should affirm the trial court's Ruling denying
Defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
Because Defendants' request for attorney fees on appeal depends on their entitlement
(or lack thereof) to attorney fees as a Rule 11 sanction, based on the above the Court
should also deny Defendants' request for attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT

It bears repeating that the Defendants Jennifer, Joseph, estate of Rose Marie,
Charles, Stanley, Samuel, Jeramiah, Orsen, Rebeccah, and Jessee Jenkins did not file a
Brief of Appellee and did not join in Elaine Jenkins's Brief of Appellee, that all the above
arguments are in response to the Elaine's Brief of Appellee, that the other Defendants have
not raised any arguments on their own behalf, and that Elaine has not argued for them and
(with the possible exception of the estate of Rose Marie) lacks standing to represent their
interests.
For the reasons stated above and in the Brief of Appellant, D. U. Company, Inc.
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's January 15, 2008 Order denying
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DATED September 25, 2008
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